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Foundations of Behavioral and Experimental Economics: 
Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith  
 
 
Until recently, economics was widely regarded as a non-experimental science that had to rely 
on observation of real-world economies rather than controlled laboratory experiments.  Many 
commentators also found restrictive the common assumption of a homo oeconomicus 
motivated by self-interest and capable of making rational decisions.  But research in 
economics has taken off in new directions.  A large and growing body of scientific work is 
now devoted to the empirical testing and modification of traditional postulates in economics, 
in particular those of unbounded rationality, pure self-interest, and complete self-control.  
Moreover, today’s research increasingly relies on new data from laboratory experiments 
rather than on more traditional field data, that is, data obtained from observations of real 
economies.  This recent research has its roots in two distinct, but converging, traditions: 
theoretical and empirical studies of human decision-making in cognitive psychology, and tests 
of predictions from economic theory by way of laboratory experiments. Today, behavioral 
economics and experimental economics are among the most active fields in economics, as 
measured by publications in major journals, new doctoral dissertations, seminars, workshops 
and conferences.  This year’s laureates are pioneers of these two fields of research.  
 
Human decision-making deviates in one way or another from the standard assumptions of the 
rationalistic paradigm in economics.  If such deviations from rationality and self-interest were 
small and purely idiosyncratic, they would on average cancel out, and economic theory would 
not be too wide off the mark when predicting outcomes for large aggregates of agents.  
Following the lead of Vernon Smith, early studies of alternative market mechanisms by 
experimental economists can be viewed as tests of the hypothesis of idiosyncratic deviations   2
from standard economic theory.  If deviations from rationality and self-interest were 
systematic, however, this would call for a revision of economic theory itself.  Following the 
lead of Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky, early studies of human decision-making 
by cognitive psychologists can be seen as testing hypotheses of systematic deviations from 
rationality. 
 
This text begins by addressing Vernon Smith’s contributions to the field of experimental 
economics.  It then considers Daniel Kahneman’s findings in the field now known as 
behavioral economics.  The final sections summarize these contributions and their 
importance, and offer some suggestions for further reading.  
 
 
1.  Foundations of experimental economics 
 
Traditionally, economics has been viewed as a non-experimental science that had to rely 
exclusively on field data:  
 
“Economics … cannot perform the controlled experiments of chemists or biologists 
because [it] cannot easily control other important factors.  Like astronomers or 
meteorologists, [it] generally must be content largely to observe.” (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus, 1985, p. 8) 
 
Many perceived this as an obstacle to the continued development of economics as a science.  
Unless controlled experiments could be carried out, tests of economic theory would remain 
restricted.  Solely on the basis of field data, it is difficult to decide whether and when a theory 
fails, and to pinpoint the aspects responsible for this failure.  The feedback channel between 
theory and observation under controlled circumstances  –  where new experimental findings 
suggest new theories and new theories suggest new experiments  –  seemed to be largely 
unavailable to economics.  
 
The establishment of a growing research field called experimental economics has radically 
challenged this view.
1  Under controlled laboratory conditions, experimentalists study human 
behavior in situations that, in simplified and pure forms, mimic those encountered in markets   3
and other forms of economic interaction.  The extent to which the results of such experiments 
can be generalized to market situations is still under debate.  But the notion that laboratory 
results concerning microeconomic behavior can crucially inform the development of 
economic theory is basically the same as the notion that laboratory results concerning small-
scale phenomena in physics (such as those pertaining to elementary particles and 
thermodynamics) can crucially inform the development of theoretical physics (with regard to 
the universe or the weather).
 2   
 
Experimental research in economics has early predecessors.  More than fifty years ago, 
Chamberlin (1948) attempted to test the neoclassical theory of perfect competition by way of 
experiments, and 1994 economics laureate Reinhard Selten conducted early experimental 
studies of price formation in oligopoly markets, the first paper being Sauerman and Selten 
(1959).  There are also early studies on the predictive power of game theory in an 
experimental setting, by John Nash – also a 1994 economics laureate – with colleagues 
(Kalish, Milnor, Nash and Nehrig, 1954) and by Flood (1959).  Furthermore Siegel and 
Fouraker (1960) and Fouraker and Siegel (1963) reported experimental results on bargaining. 
 
Without any doubt, however, the main researcher in the experimental tradition is Vernon 
Smith.  Smith not only made the most important early contributions, but has also remained a 
key figure in the field to date.  He has educated and collaborated with a large number of 
younger researchers in experimental economics.  The most prominent of these is Charles 
Plott, who has also made important contributions to the field. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 New panel data sets and advancements in econometrics, such as those recognized in the awards to Heckman 
and Mc Fadden in 2000, have also substantially improved the potential for convincing causal inference from 
observational data.  
2 External validity requires that the results uncovered in the laboratory be valid across time and space.  This may 
be a stronger assumption in economics than in meteorology or astrophysics, but theories about the atmosphere or 
the big bang that build on experimental results also have to resort to the same kind of assumption.    4
 
1.1.  Market mechanisms 
Vernon Smith’s most significant work concerns market mechanisms.  He laid the groundwork 
for this research area in innovative experiments with competitive markets (Smith, 1962), in 
tests of different auction forms (Smith, 1965, 1976b, Coppinger, Smith and Titus, 1980), and 
in the design of the so-called induced-value method (Smith, 1976a). 
 
Smith’s first experimental article (Smith, 1962) was inspired by Chamberlin’s (1948) 
classroom experiments.  Chamberlin, who was Smith’s teacher at Harvard at the time, had let 
participants engage in pairwise bargaining, acting as buyers and sellers of a fictitious good.  
Chamberlin regarded his experimental results as a falsification of the standard neoclassical 
model of a market under perfect competition (that is, with price-taking and rational agents). 
 
Smith realized that Chamberlin’s results would be more compelling if the participants were 
placed in a setting more similar to a real market.  He thus set up an experiment where subjects 
were divided into groups of potential sellers and buyers in a so-called double oral auction, a 
market mechanism used in many financial and commodity markets.  Subjects were randomly 
assigned the roles of seller and buyer, and each seller was given one unit of the good to be 
sold, and a reservation price for this unit.  If the reservation price was  v  for the unit, the 
seller was not allowed to sell below that price, while she would earn  p–v  dollars by selling at 
a price  p>v.  A seller’s reservation price  v  was her own private information.  Similarly, each 
buyer was assigned a private reservation price w, the highest price at which he was allowed to 
buy a unit.  Purchases at a price  p<w  resulted in earnings of  w-p  dollars.  Based on the 
distribution of reservation prices which he had chosen, Smith could draw a supply and a 
demand schedule and locate the competitive equilibrium price as their intersection.  The 
subjects, by contrast, did not have this information and were thus not able to compute the 
theoretical equilibrium price.  Much to his surprise, Smith found that the actual trading prices 
came close to the theoretical equilibrium price, hence supporting the theory that the 
experiments were initially supposed to reject.   
 
The result from one of his experiments is illustrated in Figure 1 (Smith, 1962, Chart 1, p. 
113).  The left-hand panel shows the demand and supply schedules induced by the given 
distribution of reservation prices.  The schedules intersect at  p = 2.00, which is thus the 
competitive equilibrium price.  The right-hand panel shows the trading prices in five   5
successive trading periods, as well as the standard deviation of the price distribution in each 
period, expressed as a percentage of the theoretical equilibrium price (the number α in the 
diagram).  As is seen in this diagram, most trading prices were close to the theoretical 






Smith concluded that 
 “…there are strong tendencies for a … competitive equilibrium to be 
attained as long as one is able to prohibit collusion and to maintain 
absolute publicity of all bids, offers, and transactions. … Changes in 
the conditions of supply and demand cause changes in the volume of 
transaction per period and the general level of contract prices. These 
latter correspond reasonably well with the predictions of competitive 




Smith and other researchers subsequently carried out a series of similar experiments to check 
whether this agreement with theory was a mere coincidence.  Later experiments continued to 
confirm Smith’s original result.  In joint work, Plott and Smith (1978) obtained the same 
general result, but added an important twist: market institutions do “matter.”  Specifically,   6
they compared the outcomes when sellers and buyers were allowed to change prices 
continuously during a trading period (Smith’s original design) with the outcomes when they 
had to post a price for an entire trading period.  The latter design turned out to result in a 
slower convergence towards the theoretical equilibrium price.  The experimental approach, as 
opposed to collecting field data, was essential in driving home this result; it made it possible 
to hold constant the “market environment” (in this case the distribution of reservation prices) 
while varying the “market institution” (in this case the rules for price adjustment) in a 
controlled fashion.  
 
In almost any market experiment, a clear test of the hypothesis in question requires 
controlling for the subjects’ preferences.  This is a major difficulty, as selling and buying will 
generally be influenced by the subjects’ idiosyncratic evaluations of gains and losses, 
evaluations that are not directly observable to the researcher.  This problem was first 
addressed by Chamberlin (1948), who suggested a method for resolving it, essentially by 
providing the subjects with the “right” monetary incentives. This so-called induced-value 
method was developed further by Smith (1976a)
 3, and has now become a standard tool in 
experimental economics.   
 
In order to illustrate this method, consider a subject assigned the role of buyer in a market for 
a homogeneous good (where all units are identical). Suppose that the experimentalist wants 
this subject to express a certain demand function  D  .  That is, at any price  p , the subject 
should be willing to buy precisely  q = D(p)  units.  But the experimentalist does not know the 
subject’s utility of wealth, u(w).  Smith’s method induces the desired demand function by 
rewarding the subject with  R(q) - pq  dollars for any quantity  q  bought at price  p , where  R  
is a suitably chosen reward function.  According to economic theory, the subject will choose 
the quantity  q  such that her marginal benefit from increasing  q  equals her marginal cost of 
doing so, that is, such that R′(q) = p.
4  As long as the unknown utility function  u  is 
increasing and concave, her demand will coincide with the desired demand function if, for 
any relevant price, the inverse derivative of the reward function  R  is set equal to the desired 
demand function, that is, if  (R′)
–1(p) = D(p) for all relevant prices p.  Similar methods have 
been applied ever since in the experimental literature.  
 
                                                           
3 Smith had sketched this method in an earlier working paper (Smith, 1973). 
4 If the quantity q maximizes the subject’s utility of wealth, u(R(q)-pq), then the first-order condition    7
 
1.2.  Tests of auction theory 
Auction theory has emerged as one of the most successful developments in microeconomic 
theory and game theory since the early 1960s.  A number of precise theoretical results for a 
variety of auction forms were developed by the late economics laureate William Vickrey, 
followed by a number of younger researchers (see Krishna, 2002, for an overview).  Smith 
initiated the experimental testing of many of these propositions, and has published extensively 
on the subject (see, for example, Smith, 1976b, Coppinger, Smith and Titus, 1980, and Cox, 
Robertson and Smith, 1982).  Moreover, he pioneered the use of controlled laboratory 
experiments as “wind tunnel” tests of new auction designs – for which precise theoretical 
predictions are hard to obtain – before they are used in practice (see section 1.3). 
 
As the term is commonly understood, auctions may seem of little importance for real-world 
economies.  However, by proceeding from simpler to more complex auction forms, theory has 
deepened our understanding of the functioning of many real-world markets.  Even some of the 
simpler auction forms studied in theory are widely used in practice, particularly in the context 
of deregulation and privatization of natural monopolies, public procurement, the sale of 
government bonds, etc.   
 
Central to Smith’s experimental work on auctions are the established theoretical predictions 
for certain auction forms used in the sale of a single object.  Such auctions are traditionally 
classified into four types.  In an English or ascending auction, buyers announce their bids 
sequentially and in an increasing order, until no higher bid is submitted.  In a Dutch or 
descending auction, a high initial bid by the seller is gradually lowered in fixed steps at fixed 
times regulated by a clock, until some buyer shouts “buy,” whereupon the clock stops.  Both 
of these auctions are usually oral, and the trading price is the last (first) bidder’s bid.  In the 
other two auction forms, all bidders instead simultaneously submit their bids in sealed 
envelopes and the unit for sale is allocated to the highest bidder.  In the first-price sealed-bid 
auction, this bidder pays his or her bid to the seller; while in the second-price sealed-bid 
auction, this bidder pays only the second highest bid.  
 
Microeconomic theory also distinguishes between auctions with private and common values.  
In both cases, the value to each buyer is treated as a random variable. In the case of private 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
u′(w)(R′(q)-p)= 0 has to be met, granted u is differentiable.   8
values, these valuations are statistically independent across the population of potential bidders 
– the value to a buyer is his or her purely idiosyncratic valuation of the object.  In common-
value auctions, by contrast, the value to the buyers also has a common component, such as a 
resale market value or the conditions in some related market (examples include spectrum 
auctions and telecommunication markets).   
 
Economic theory makes the following three predictions in the case of private values:  (1) 
English and second-price auctions are equivalent, in terms of who will (probabilistically) 
obtain the item and the expected revenue to the seller.  This result follows from individual 
rationality (more precisely, from assuming that bidders do not use weakly dominated 
strategies).  (2) Dutch and first-price auctions are equivalent, a result which follows from the 
more restrictive assumption of Nash equilibrium behavior, that is, individual rationality 
combined with interpersonally consistent expectations.  (3) All four auction forms are 
equivalent if all buyers are risk neutral (that is, if they are indifferent between participating in 
an actuarially fair lottery and obtaining the expected lottery prize for sure; see also section 2).   
 
Smith carried out many experiments – once more, controlling for demand and supply 
conditions, while varying the market institution – in order to empirically test these and other 
theoretical predictions.
5  In order to generate private values, each bidder was given a 
randomly and independently drawn number, v, which was kept private to the bidder.  If the 
bidder won the auction and paid the price p, this subject would earn the monetary amount  p–
v.  In regard to prediction (1) above, Smith discovered that English and sealed-bid second-
price auctions indeed produce similar experimental outcomes, just as theory says. As for (2), 
Dutch and sealed-price first-price auctions did not give rise to equivalent outcomes, in 
contrast with theory. In the case of (3), he found that models which presume that buyers have 
identical attitudes toward risk could be rejected. Furthermore, he found that the average sale 
price was higher in English and sealed-bid second-price auctions than in sealed-bid first-price 
auctions, and that the latter yielded higher average selling prices than Dutch auctions. 
 
Of these results, one of the most unexpected was that Dutch and sealed-bid first-price auctions 
turned out to be unequivalent. Two theoretical explanations have been suggested.  One is that 
utility depends not only on the monetary outcome but also on the “suspense of waiting” in the   9
Dutch auction, the other that bidders underestimate the increased risk associated with waiting 
in the Dutch auction.  These and other possible reasons for the observed non-equivalence 
between the two auctions are explored in Smith (1991b).   
 
 
1.3.  The laboratory as a “wind tunnel” 
 
Smith, as well as Plott, initiated the use of the laboratory as a “wind tunnel” (a laboratory 
setup used to test prototypes for aircraft) in order to study the performance of proposed 
institutional mechanisms for deregulation, privatization, and the provision of public goods.  
These mechanisms are usually so complex that existing theory does not provide precise 
predictions, which makes the experimental method particularly useful.  In a series of studies 
(Smith, 1979a-c, 1980, and Coursey and Smith, 1984) he studied the design of incentive-
compatible mechanisms for the provision of public goods.  In these experiments, Smith tested 
the effectiveness of mechanisms proposed by economic theorists, as well as some of his own 
variants.  Smith has also done experimental work on mechanisms to allocate airport time slots 
by means of computer-assisted markets (Bulfin, Rasenti and Smith, 1982, and McCabe, 
Rasenti and Smith, 1989) and on alternative organizations of energy markets (Rasenti, Smith 
and Wilson, 2001).   
 
 
1.4.  Experimental methodology 
Apart from substantive results on markets and auctions, Smith’s work has had an enormous 
methodological impact.  His seminal American Economic Review article “Experimental 
economics: Induced-value theory”(Smith, 1976a), provided a practical and detailed guide to 
the design of economic experiments in the laboratory and a motivation for these guidelines 
(see also Smith, 1982).  In recent years, this paper has served as a paradigm for experimental 
scholars in economics.   
 
The experimental method developed by Smith deviates from the experimental approach used 
in psychology (cf. section 2).  It emphasizes the importance of providing subjects with 
sufficient monetary incentives, in order to outweigh the distorting effects of decision costs.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Smith (1976b) is a seminal paper on this topic.  See also Coppinger, Smith and Titus (1980), who seem to have 
been the first to test these propositions in a comparison of all four types of auction, and Cox, Roberson and 
Smith (1982).   10
Smith’s method also emphasizes the importance of designing experiments as repeated trials, 
so that the subjects can become familiar with and understand the experimental situation.  
 
In many respects, the differences vis-à-vis psychologically oriented methods are a matter of 
focus. Whereas psychologists have been predominantly interested in individual behavior, 
Smith designed his original experiments mainly to analyze market outcomes.  Genuine 
differences of opinion about the appropriate methodology have not subsided, however.  To 
some extent, they reflect two different approaches to understanding human behavior, as 
further discussed in section 2 (see Smith, 1991a, and Loewenstein, 1999, for different sides of 
the debate).
6   
 
Be that as it may, Smith’s approach to experimentation constitutes a vital contribution, of 
relevance not only for economists but also for other social scientists.  For instance, Plott’s 
experiments on decision-making in committees (Fiorina and Plott, 1978) followed much the 
same approach and generated an extensive experimental literature in political science.  
 
 
2.  Foundations of behavioral economics 
 
Nearly half a century ago, Edwards (1954) introduced decision-making as a research topic for 
psychologists, outlining an agenda for future research. Allais (1953a,b) outlined a 
 psychology-based positive theory of choice under uncertainty, while Simon (1956) proposed 
an approach to information processing and decision-making based on bounded rationality. But 
research in cognitive psychology did not come into its own until Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky (deceased in 1996) published their findings on judgment and decision-making.  
Although adhering to the tradition of cognitive psychology, Kahneman’s research has equally 
well been directed towards economists.  Many of his articles have been published in 
economics journals; one article, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), even has the highest citation 
count of all articles published in Econometrica, by many considered the most prestigious 
journal in economics.  Given the barriers to communicating across traditional disciplines, 
considerable effort has gone into building a bridge between research in economics and 
psychology.  Nowadays, there are in fact two bridges between these disciplines – one built 
                                                           
6 The importance of monetary incentives or repetition obviously depends on the hypothesis that the experiment is 
supposed to test.  Incentives may also affect different cognitive functions in distinct ways (Nilsson, 1987).   11
around experimental methods and the other around theoretical modeling.  Both serve as the 
basis for the current wave of work in behavioral economics.  Before discussing Kahneman’s 
specific contributions, the next section outlines some differences between conceptions of 
decision-making in economics and psychology.  
 
 
2.1.  Decision-making in economics and psychology 
Economists typically assume that market behavior is motivated primarily by material 
incentives, and that economic decisions are governed mainly by self-interest and rationality.  
In this context, rationality means that decision-makers use available information in a logical 
and systematic way, so as to make optimal choices given the alternatives at hand and the 
objective to be reached.  It also implies that decisions are made in a forward-looking way, by 
fully taking into account future consequences of current decisions.  In other words, so-called 
extrinsic incentives are assumed to shape economic behavior. 
 
In psychology, especially cognitive psychology, a human being is commonly regarded as a 
system, which codes and interprets available information in a conscious and rational way.  
But other, less conscious, factors are also assumed to govern human behavior in a systematic 
way.  It is this more complex view – where intrinsic incentives help shape human behavior – 
that has come to penetrate recent developments in economic theory. 
 
Economists have traditionally treated a decision-maker’s preferences over available 
alternatives as fixed and given.  The decision-maker is assumed to form probabilistic beliefs 
or expectations about the state of nature and the effects of her actions, and to process available 
information according to statistical principles.  More precisely, standard economic theory 
relies on the expected-utility maximization approach founded by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) and extended by Savage (1953).  Here, it is presumed that for every 
decision-maker there exists some real-valued function  u, defined on the relevant set  X  of 
outcomes x1,x2,…xI, such that if one available action  a  results in probabilities  pi  over the 
outcomes  xi  (for i=1,…,I) and another available action  b  results in probabilities  qi  over the 
same outcomes, then the decision-maker (strictly) prefers action  a  to action  b  if and only if    12
the statistically expected value of this “utility function”  u  is greater under  a  than under  b.
7  
Formally, the criterion for choosing  a  is thus 
 
   ∑i pi u(xi) >  ∑i qi u(xi)  .              (1) 
 
Hence, given existing market conditions, which define the choice set available to the decision-
maker, the cognitive process is reduced to a problem of expectation formation and 
maximization.  The decision-maker is thus assumed to behave as if she correctly assigned 
probabilities to relevant random events and chose an action that maximized the expected 
value of her resulting utility. 
 
By contrast, cognitive psychologists consider an interactive process where several factors may 
influence a decision in a non-trivial way.  These components include perception, which 
follows its own laws, as well as beliefs or mental models for interpreting situations as they 
arise.  Intrinsic motives, such as emotions – the state of mind of the decision-maker – and 
attitudes  – stable psychological tendencies to relate to a given phenomenon in one’s 
environment – may influence a decision.  Moreover, the memory of previous decisions and 
their consequences serves as a critical cognitive function that also has a strong influence on 
current decision-making.  Given this complex view, human behavior is regarded as locally 
conditioned to a given situation.  Typically, behavior is adaptive; it is dependent on the 
context and transitory perceptual conditions.   
 
These differences between psychology and traditional economics also show up in research 
methodology.  While experiments in economics often emphasize the generality of a situation 
and comprise monetary rewards and repeated trials, psychologists try to capture intrinsic 
motivations and the mental processes at work in a particular decision situation, what has been 
termed the framing of a decision problem.   
  
Extensive behavioral evidence, collected by Kahneman and others through surveys and 
experiments, calls the assumption of economic rationality into question, at least in complex 
decision situations.  A number of studies have uncovered a non-trivial amount of deviations 
from the traditional model of rational economic behavior.  For example, real-world decision-
makers do not always evaluate uncertain prospects according to the laws of probability, and 
                                                           
7 To be exact, the function u is not a utility function: such functions map decision alternatives (here actions) into   13
sometimes make decisions that violate the principles of expected-utility maximization 
outlined above.  Kahneman’s major contributions concerning judgment and decisions under 
uncertainty are discussed in the following. 
 
 
2.2.  Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases 
Kahneman and Tversky discovered how judgment under uncertainty systematically departs 
from the kind of rationality postulated in traditional economic theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1972, 1973, Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1982).  A basic notion 
underlying much of Kahneman and Tversky’s early research is that people in general are 
frequently unable to fully analyze situations that involve economic and probabilistic 
judgments.  In such situations, human judgment relies on certain shortcuts or heuristics, which 
are sometimes systematically biased.  
 
One fundamental bias is that individuals appear to use a law of small numbers, attributing the 
same probability distribution to the empirical mean value from small and large samples, 
thereby violating the law of large numbers in probability theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1971). For example, in a well-known experiment it was found that subjects thought it equally 
likely that more than 60 percent of births on a given day would be boys in a small hospital as 
in a large hospital.  In general, people do not appear to realize how fast the variance of the 
sample mean of a random variable decreases with sample size.   
 
More precisely, according to the statistical laws of large numbers, the probability distribution 
of the mean from a large sample of independent observations of a random variable is 
concentrated at the expected value of the random variable, and the variance of the sample 
mean goes to zero as the sample size increases.
8  According to the psychological law of small 
numbers, by contrast, people believe that the mean value from a small sample also has a 
distribution concentrated at the expected value of the random variable.  This leads to “over-
inference” from short sequences of independent observations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the real numbers. 
8 According to the most basic version of the law of large numbers, the following claim is essentially true for all 
ε>0 and for any infinite sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with mean µ: the 
probability that the sample mean will deviate more than ε from µ goes to zero as the sample size goes to infinity.   14
An example of the law of small numbers is when an investor observes a fund manager 
performing above average two years in a row and concludes that the fund manager is much 
better than average, while the true statistical implication is very weak. A related example is 
the so-called gambler’s fallacy: many individuals expect the second draw of a random 
mechanism to be negatively correlated with the first, even if the draws are statistically 
independent.  If a few early tosses of a fair coin give disproportionately many heads, many 
individuals believe that the next flip is more likely to be tails. Recent work, such as Rabin 
(2002), describes the importance of the law of small numbers for economic decisions. 
 
The law of small numbers is related to representativeness, a heuristic which Kahneman and 
Tversky discovered to be an important ingredient in human judgment.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973, 1974, 1982) illustrated the function of this heuristic in several elegant 
experiments.  Subjects were asked to categorize persons, e.g., as a “salesman” or a “member 
of parliament,” on the basis of given descriptions.  Confronted with a description of an 
individual – randomly drawn from a given population – as “interested in politics, likes to 
participate in debates, and is eager to appear in the media,” most subjects would say that the 
person is a member of parliament, even though the higher proportion of salespersons in the 
population makes it more likely that the person is a salesman.  This observed heuristic way of 
thinking was examined further by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), who report an experiment 
where some subjects received explicit information about the true proportions in the 
population. One design stated that the person to be categorized was drawn from a pool of 30 
percent engineers and 70 percent lawyers, while another design reversed these proportions.  
The results revealed that this difference had virtually no effect on subjects’ judgment.   
 
The same heuristic can also prompt people to believe that the joint probability of two events is 
larger than the probability of one of the constituent events, in contradiction to a fundamental 
principle of probability (the so-called conjunction rule).  For instance, some subjects in an 
experiment thought that if Björn Borg reached the Wimbledon final, he would be less likely to 
lose the first set than to lose the first set and win the match.   
 
In an overview of behavioral finance, Shleifer (2000) argues that the law of small numbers 
and representativeness may explain certain anomalies in financial markets.  For example, the 
excess sensitivity of stock prices (Shiller, 1981) may be a result of investors’ overreacting to 
short strings of good news.   15
 
Another bias common in probabilistic judgment is availability, whereby people judge 
probabilities by the ease of conjuring up examples. The result is that disproportionately high 
weight is assigned to salient or easily remembered information (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1973).  People thus overstate, say, the probability of violent crimes in a city if they personally 
know someone who has been assaulted, even if they have access to more relevant aggregate 
statistics.  A general finding in cognitive psychology is that, compared to unfamiliar 
information, familiar information is more easily accessible from memory and is believed to be 
more real or relevant.  Familiarity and availability may thus serve as cues for accuracy and 
relevance.  Therefore, mere repetition of certain information in the media, regardless of its 
accuracy, makes it more easily available and therefore falsely perceived as more accurate. 
 
Such evidence on human judgment demonstrates that people’s reasoning violates basic laws 
of probability in a systematic way.  By demonstrating this, Kahneman's research has seriously 
questioned the empirical validity of one of the fundamentals of traditional economic theory. 
 
 
2.3.  Decision-making under uncertainty: prospect theory 
Available evidence indicates that not only judgment, but also decision-making under 
uncertainty departs in a systematic way from traditional economic theory.  In particular, many 
decisions under uncertainty diverge from the predictions of expected-utility theory.   
 
Departures from the von Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage expected-utility theories of decisions 
under uncertainty were first pointed out by the 1988 economics laureate Maurice Allais 
(1953a), who established the so-called Allais paradox (see also Ellsberg, 1961, for a related 
paradox).  For example, many individuals prefer a certain gain of 3,000 dollars to a lottery 
giving 4,000 dollars with 80% probability and 0 otherwise.  However, some of these same 
individuals also prefer winning 4,000 dollars with 20% probability to winning 3,000 dollars 
with 25% probability, even though the probabilities for the gains were scaled down by the 
same factor, 0.25, in both alternatives (from 80% to 20%, and from 100% to 25%). Such 
preferences violate the so-called substitution axiom of expected-utility theory.
9  Kahneman 
has provided extensive evidence of departures from the predictions of expected utility (see 
                                                           
9 By this axiom, if a decision-maker prefers lottery A to B, he should also prefer a probability mixture  pA + (1-
p)C  to the probability mixture  pB + (1-p)C , for all lotteries  C.   16
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992, Kahneman and Lovallo, 
1993, and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990).   
 
One striking finding is that people are often much more sensitive to the way an outcome 
differs from some non-constant reference level (such as the status quo) than to the outcome 
measured in absolute terms.  This focus on changes rather than levels may be related to well-
established psychophysical laws of cognition, whereby humans are more sensitive to changes 
than to levels of outside conditions, such as temperature or light. 
 
Moreover, people appear to be more adverse to losses, relative to their reference level, than 
attracted by gains of the same size.  Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated that the value 
attached to a moderate loss is about twice the value attached to an equally large gain.  That is, 
people’s preferences seem to be characterized by (local) loss aversion.  With small stakes, 
they generally prefer the status quo to a fifty-fifty chance of winning, say, 12 dollars or losing 
10 dollars. This renders counterfactual the implied preferences over large gains and losses, 
according to conventional economic analysis; see Rabin (2000).  The common finding of 
apparently risk-loving behavior with respect to large losses is inconsistent with the traditional 
assumption of risk aversion.
10  For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that seven 
out of ten people prefer a 25% probability of losing 6,000 dollars, to a 50% probability of 
losing either 4,000 or 2,000 dollars, with equal probability (25%) for each.  Since the 
expected monetary value of the two lotteries is the same, the first lottery is a mean-preserving 
spread of the second, and should thus not be preferred under conventional risk aversion. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky moved beyond criticism, however, and suggested an alternative 
modeling framework in their seminal article, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions 
under Risk” (1979).  While expected-utility theory is axiomatic, their prospect theory is 
descriptive.  It was thus developed in an inductive way from empirical observations, rather 
than deductively from a set of logically appealing axioms.  Later, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1986) argued that two theories are in fact required: expected-utility theory to characterize 
rational behavior and something like prospect theory to describe actual behavior.  Although 
expected-utility theory provides an accurate representation of actual choices in some 
                                                           
10 As explained in Section 1, a decision-maker is called risk neutral if she is indifferent between participating in 
any actuarially fair lottery and obtaining the expected prize for sure. A decision-maker who prefers the expected 
prize for sure is called risk averse, while she is called risk loving if she prefers the lottery.    17
transparent and simple decision problems, most real-life decision problems are complex and 
call for behaviorally richer models. 
 
What, then, are the differences between the two theories?  In the case of monetary gains and 
losses, the decision criterion in expected-utility theory, equation (1) above, presumes the 
existence of a real-valued function  u  of wealth  w, for the decision-maker in the current 
situation.  If action  a  induces probabilities  pi  over the different levels  wi  of wealth, and 
action  b  induces probabilities  qi, then the decision-maker (strictly) prefers  a  to  b  if and 
only if  
 
   ∑i pi u(wi) > ∑i qi u(wi) .                                (2) 
 
By contrast, prospect theory postulates the existence of two functions,  v  and  π , such that the 
decision-maker (strictly) prefers action  a  over action  b  if and only if  
 
  ∑ i π(pi)v(∆wi) > ∑ i π(qi)v(∆wi) ,            (3) 
 
where  ∆wi=wi-wo  is the deviation in wealth from some reference level  wo   (which may be 
initial or aspired wealth, see below).  
 
There are three differences between the two models.  First, in prospect theory, the decision-
maker is not concerned with final values of wealth per se, but with changes in wealth, ∆w, 
relative to some reference point.  This reference point is often the decision-maker’s current 
level of wealth, so that gains and losses are defined relative to the status quo.  But the 
reference level can also be some aspiration level: a wealth level the subject strives to acquire, 
given his or her current wealth and expectations.  Kahneman and Tversky argued that a 
decision problem has two stages.  It is “edited”, so as to establish an appropriate reference 
point for the decision at hand.  The outcome of such a choice is then “coded” as a gain when it 
exceeds this point and as a loss when the outcome falls short of it.  This editing stage is 
followed by an evaluation stage, which is based on the criterion in (3).  
 
The second difference relative to expected-utility theory concerns the value function  v  .  In 
addition to being defined over changes in wealth, this function is S-shaped. Thus it is concave 
for gains and convex for losses, displaying diminishing sensitivity to change in both 
directions.  Furthermore, it has a kink at zero, being steeper for small losses than for small   18
gains. The function  u  in expected-utility theory, by contrast, is usually taken to be smooth 
and concave everywhere.  The form of the value function is illustrated in Figure 2 (Figure 3 
in Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
Third, the decision-weight function π  is a transformation of the objective probabilities  p  and  
q . This function is monotonically increasing, with discontinuities at 0 and 1, such that it 
systematically gives overweight to small probabilities and underweight to large probabilities. 




Figure 2  Figure 3 
 
These differences make prospect theory consistent with the experimental evidence mentioned 
earlier in thissection.  Since people evaluate risky prospects on the basis of changes in wealth 
relative to some reference level, appropriate assumptions about the editing stage would make 
the model consistent with the common observation that people choose differently depending 
on how a problem is framed.  The kink on the value function at the reference point – making 
the function much steeper for small losses than for small gains – implies that choices are 
consistent with loss aversion.  As a consequence of the diminishing marginal sensitivity to 
change in the v function, decision-makers become risk averse towards gains (they value large 
gains less than proportionally) and risk loving towards losses (they value large losses less than 
proportionally), in line with the evidence.  Moreover, the fact that the decision-weight 
function overweighs small probabilities and underweighs large probabilities can explain the 
Allais paradox. 
   19
Already Allais (1953 a,b) outlined foundations for a psychologically based theory of 
preferences over uncertain prospects with monetary outcomes. Unlike prospect theory, Allais 
attached (cardinal) utilities to final wealth levels, but like prospect theory, he made a 
distinction between objective probabilities and the decision-maker's perception of these. 
Allais suggested that objective probabilities be transformed differently for gains and losses, in 
such a way that the perceived probabilities sum to one. 
 
Prospect theory may also capture several regularities that appear as anomalies from the 
perspective of traditional economic theory: the propensity for people to take out expensive 
small-scale insurance when buying appliances; their willingness to drive to a distant store to 
save a few dollars on a small purchase, but reluctance to make the same trip for an equally 
large discount on an expensive item; or their resistance to lowering consumption in response 
to bad news about lifetime income. 
  
In sum, the empirical work conducted by Kahneman and others indicates several regularities 
in choice under uncertainty, and the ideas incorporated in prospect theory go a long way 
towards explaining these regularities.  Kahneman’s results have provided researchers in 
economics with new insights and have been instrumental in subsequent model building by 
alerting decision analysts to the errors commonly committed by real-life decision-makers.  A  
further extension of prospect theory, known as cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) addresses some weaknesses of the original version.  In particular, 
cumulative prospect theory allows for prospects with a large number of outcomes, and it is 
consistent with stochastic dominance.
11  
 
Prospect theory and its extensions have taken important steps towards a more accurate 
description of individual behavior under risk than expected-utility theory.  It now forms the 
basis for much of the applied empirical work in this field.  
 
                                                           
11 Cumulative prospect theory combines prospect theory with a cumulative approach developed by Quiggin 
(1982), Schmeidler (1989) and Luce and Fishburn (1991).   20
 
3.  Summary  
 
Daniel Kahneman has used insights from cognitive psychology regarding the mental 
processes of answering questions, forming judgments, and making choices, to help us better 
understand how people make economic decisions.  Other psychologists have also made 
important contributions along the same lines.  But Kahneman’s work with Tversky on 
decision-making under uncertainty clearly stands out as the most influential.  Kahneman also 
made early contributions to other areas of behavioral economics.  One example is his joint 
work with Knetsch and Thaler (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986) on the importance of 
fairness considerations.  This has become a lively field of research, and many experimental 
studies have subsequently been carried out by other researchers, showing that a variety of 
market behaviors can be derived from considerations of fairness and reciprocity (see e.g. Fehr 
and Falk, 2002 for a recent review).  Through this and other work, Kahneman has been a 
major source of inspiration behind the recent boom of research in behavioral economics and 
finance.  His research has also had a substantial impact in other fields.  It is widely quoted in 
other social sciences as well as within the natural sciences, the humanities and medicine.  
 
Vernon Smith is the most influential figure in launching experiments as an empirical 
methodology in economics.  Unlike Kahneman, he did not start out by challenging the 
traditional economic theory of rational decision-making.  Rather, he tested alternative 
hypotheses regarding market performance, in particular the importance of different market 
institutions.  While Kahneman’s surveys and experiments have mainly focused on decisions 
by individual agents, Smith has focused his experiments on the interaction between agents in 
specific market environments.  He has also emphasized methodological issues, developing 
practical experimental methods and establishing standards for what constitutes a good 
experiment.
12  Other researchers have furthered this tradition.  Charles Plott, in particular, has 
written several important papers, further developed the experimental methodology and spear-
headed experimental research in new areas.  But it is largely through Smith's achievement that 
many economists have come to view laboratory experiments as an essential tool.   
 
                                                           
12 Since experimentation with human subjects had been a well-established method in psychology for almost a 
century, it was more important for Smith than for Kahneman to develop experimental methodology.   21
A current wave of research draws on the combined traditions of psychology and experimental 
economics.  This new research is potentially significant for all areas of economics and 
finance.  Experimental evidence indicates that certain psychological phenomena – such as 
bounded rationality, limited self-interest, and imperfect self-control – are important factors 
behind a range of market outcomes.  To the extent parsimonious behavioral theories, 
consistent with this evidence, can be developed, they may eventually replace elements of 
traditional economic theory.  A challenging task in financial economics is to consider the 
extent to which the effects of systematic irrationality on asset prices will be weeded out by 
market arbitrage. 
 
Although Kahneman's and Smith's research agendas differ in many respects, their combined 
scientific contributions have already changed the direction of economic science. Economics 
used to be limited to theorizing by way of a relatively simple rationalistic model of human 
decision-making, homo oeconomicus, and to empirical work on field data.  When they 
appeared, Kahneman’s and Smith’s initial works were received with skepticism by the 
scientific community in economics.  It took considerable time and much further research 
before their main ideas seriously began to penetrate the profession.  It is their achievement 
that many – perhaps most – economists today view psychological insights and experimental 
methods as essential ingredients in modern economics.  
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